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Abstract: This study explored how the determinants of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral 
controls vary in foreign subsidiary manager performance evaluations. Possible impacts of the 
following factors were analyzed: extent of geographical dispersion, decentralization and 
perceived environmental changes. Hypotheses were tested, using principal component and 
multiple regression analysis, with data collected from annual reports and from 103 top managers 
from a wide range of Finnish business unit headquarters. The results suggest that in MNCs top 
management’s emphasis on financial controls tends to remain very high regardless of the 
contingencies analyzed. However, the data support several regularities between the factors 
examined and nonfinancial controls in particular, and behavioral controls to a smaller extent. 
This, in turn, leads to variations in the relative emphasis on financial controls. 
 
Keywords: Management control systems, Output control, Behavioral control, Managerial 
performance evaluation, Multinational companies, Survey.  
 
 
1   Introduction  
 
Much management research has focused on the reliance on financial evaluations in multinational 
settings, where organizations are challenged by the need to manage geographically dispersed 
foreign subsidiary managers.
1
 Likewise, an extensive accounting literature has examined 
reliance on accounting performance measure (RAPM) in managerial performance evaluations in 
domestic settings, and research on nonfinancial control has been growing.
2
 However, empirical 
evidence on wider management control systems is still sparse, despite the fact that such systems 
have been implemented in practice. This study complements existing literature by systematically 
examining how the determinants of multiple forms of controls vary in foreign subsidiary 
manager performance evaluations. The determinants selected comprise both more novel and 
traditional contingencies, but from the perspectives of multinational companies (MNCs). The 
following variables were simultaneously examined as possible determinants: extent of 
geographical dispersion of foreign subsidiaries, decentralization of decision-making rights to 
foreign subsidiary managers, and perceived environmental changes (PECs) in foreign 
subsidiaries.  
 
Following prior empirical studies by Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995), Abernethy and 
Brownell (1997), Kennedy and Widener (2005), and Kihn (1997, 2001, 2007), this study makes 
a distinction between output controls and behavioral controls. The examined financial and 
nonfinancial ‘output’ and ‘behavioral’ controls are used synonymously with ‘results’ and ‘action 
accountability’ controls (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). These two forms of control differ 
from each other in important ways. By definition, the object of output controls is a financial or 
nonfinancial outcome or result. Hence, output controls empower employees to take the actions 
they believe will best produce the desired results. In contrast, the purpose of behavioral controls 
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is to ensure that employees take only desirable actions. Behavioral (action accountability) 
controls involve holding employees accountable for the actions they take in accordance with 
predetermined rules, procedures, policies, contract provisions, and company codes of conduct 
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). In addition to analyzing absolute emphasis on these 
controls, the study also addressed emphasis on financial controls relative to nonfinancial and 
behavioral controls (i.e., relative emphasis on financial controls).  
 
Performance evaluations of managers of foreign subsidiaries were analyzed primarily with 
explorative factor analysis and multiple regression analysis using data collected from annual 
reports (n=90) and scores collected from 103 (59% response rate) top managers from a wide 
range of Finnish business unit headquarters (HQs). Data of the frequency and geographical 
dispersion of foreign subsidiaries were collected from annual reports; the rest of the data were 
collected with a mail survey. Overall, the MNCs examined had established or acquired foreign 
subsidiaries worldwide. The foreign subsidiary managers included both managers on foreign 
assignments and host country nationals.  
 
The empirical results contribute to research on MNCs and to accounting literature. First, given 
that the literature has traditionally focused on financial controls, finding a very high emphasis on 
such controls in MNCs, there has been little information about exactly how other types of 
controls are emphasized, and what determines it. Second, literature on the relative use of 
performance measures and its determinants has still been fairly limited (Ittner and Larcker, 
1997; Keating, 1997; Kihn, 1997, 2001).  
 
The multiple regression results of the study further our understanding of the contingent nature of 
management control by showing how a combination of situational factors simultaneously 
impacts the emphasis placed on each of the types of controls. While examined determinants get 
at least some empirical support, the data also help to identify what types of contextual factors 
appear to be the most important determinants and what types of simultaneous effects they can 
have on the emphasis of controls. Taken together, the results support the expectation that, 
overall, the absolute emphasis of business unit HQs on financial controls tends to remain very 
high, but that there can be situational variations in the emphasis placed on nonfinancial and 
behavioral controls, and consequently, situational variation in the relative emphasis on financial 
controls. Whilst these results are based on a sample of MNCs headquartered in Finland, they 
should further understanding of managerial performance evaluations of MNCs in general. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: First, prior literature and hypotheses to 
be explored are introduced in the next section. Second, the sample and methods employed are 
described. Third, the statistical findings are analyzed. Finally, the conclusions are presented. 
 
2  Prior literature and hypotheses development  
 
The generic theory relating to the relative use of various forms of controls suggests that output 
controls are ideally used when managers have knowledge of, and ability to affect, desirable 
outputs, and the ability to measure controllable outputs in an effective way (Thompson, 1967; 
Ouchi, 1979). Being effective means that measures should be reasonably precise, objective, 
timely, understandable, and cost-effective. In being indirect (i.e., not focusing explicitly on the 
employees’ behavior), output controls can be effective when it is not clear what behaviors and 
actions are most desirable. In contrast, the effective use of behavioral controls in managerial 
performance evaluations requires that managers know what actions are desirable (or 
undesirable), and have the ability to track the behaviors that employees engage in to ensure that 
the desirable actions take place (or that the undesirable actions do not) (Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2007).  
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Prior research on MNCs has primarily examined the reliance on and importance of financial 
output controls. The predominant finding has been that the same financial controls, such as 
return-on-investment and profit, are used in evaluating foreign and domestic operations. This 
result has been obtained in studies on U.S. MNCs
3
, in surveys comparing U.S. and European 
MNCs (Choi and Czechowicz, 1983), for U.K. companies (Appleyard, Strong, and Walton, 
1990), and for Finnish MNCs (Björkman and Lindqvist, 1991; Hassel, 1991; Kihn, 2007).  
 
Certain differences have also been found between U.S. and European MNCs, as well as 
among European companies. Schoenfeld (1986) documented that U.S. MNCs apply financial 
controls to a greater extent than the European MNCs examined thus far. Egelhoff’s (1984) 
field study proposed that U.S. MNCs rely strongly on quantifiable and objective aspects, 
while European, including U.K., MNCs emphasize behavioral and qualitative criteria and 
staff their foreign units with expatriates. Horovitz (1978, 1980) and Coates et al. (1991) 
found that financial controls were more strongly emphasized by U.K. companies than by 
German and French companies, some of which place greater emphasis on nonfinancial 
controls such as production controls or market shares. According to Björkman and 
Lindqvist’s (1991) findings, financial controls were considered to be the most important 
measures in Finnish MNC, while informal evaluation and managers’ ability to adhere to 
budgets were also assessed. Kihn’s (1997) empirical results on Finnish MNCs showed that, 
overall, financial control was the most important form of control in foreign subsidiary 
manager performance evaluations, followed by nonfinancial and behavioral controls.  
 
As discussed below in greater detail, it is expected here that top management’s absolute and 
relative emphasis on financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls in managerial 
performance evaluations may vary with regard to a number of situational factors, the first one 
being the extent of geographical dispersion of foreign operations. Note that MNCs are not 
only organized by function and product line, but also by geography. As the geographical 
dispersion of operations to various parts of the world increases, MNCs typically face greater 
geographical and cultural distances, barriers of time zones and language, as well as local 
differences.  
  
This study expects that the geographical dispersion of operations to various parts of the world 
mostly limits the emphasis on behavioral controls. Even if modern information technologies 
have made communication between HQs and foreign subsidiaries with great geographical 
and cultural distances somewhat easier, it still is difficult. In MNCs, top management cannot 
easily visit foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, the cost of behavioral controls rises significantly 
with geographical dispersion (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007).  
 
In contrast, increasing geographical dispersion is unlikely to limit effectiveness, in particular, 
understandability, timeliness, and cost, of output controls as much as that of behavioral 
controls – at least from the viewpoint of HQs. When geographically dispersed, various parts 
of an organization are often more likely to employ multiple and diverse sets of nonfinancial 
controls. Therefore, HQs’ use and emphasis on nonfinancial controls is expected to increase 
with increasing geographical dispersion.  
 
With increasing geographical dispersion, HQs’ emphasis on financial controls is not likely to 
change, but to remain high. Financial controls are reasonably effective, and often the only 
source of quantitative information integrating the results of all the different parts of an 
organization, thereby allowing comparison of the results of various managers and 
geographical units in terms of a single dimension (Emmanuel et al., 1991, p. 6-7). Prior 
research has documented that MNCs generally place a very high emphasis on financial 
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controls. Therefore, MNC’s emphasis on financial controls cannot necessarily increase (or 
decrease), but is likely to remain very high despite increasing (or decreasing) geographical 
dispersion. In conclusion, with increasing geographical dispersion, HQs of MNCs may 
increase their emphasis on nonfinancial controls and decrease their emphasis on behavioral 
controls. Such adjustments are likely to lead to a higher relative emphasis on financial 
controls.   
 
Decentralization is the second contingency variable addressed in this study. It refers here to 
the level of decision-making autonomy delegated to foreign subsidiary managers. Since only 
foreign subsidiary managers mostly possess the necessary intimate awareness of the 
circumstances surrounding the local operations, the right to make operational decisions has 
often been delegated to those managers. According to Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1998) study on 
Asian, European, and U.S. MNCs, this has often been the case in European-based MNCs, 
where foreign subsidiaries are typically autonomous units (profit or investment centers) and 
not subject to intense HQ coordination.  
 
Several studies have found decentralization to enhance the use of financial control (e.g., Bruns 
and Waterhouse, 1975; and Vancil, 1979), and budgets (Merchant, 1981). This may be because 
managers of decentralized organizations perceive aggregated and integrated information as 
useful: managers prefer to be evaluated on performance measures that are aggregated and 
integrated in ways that reflect their area of responsibility (Chenhall and Morris, 1986). When a 
company consists of relatively autonomous subunits, financial controls also provide relatively 
precise estimates of the performance of managers, which makes their use more appropriate 
(Abernethy, Bouwens, and van Lent, 2004).  
 
Given that decentralization of decision-making also increases information asymmetry between 
top management and subordinate managers (cf., Abernethy et al., 2004), it may become more 
difficult to rely on nonfinancial controls, in particular if the businesses and measures are not the  
same throughout the decentralized units. Given high information asymmetry, top managers’ 
knowledge of local operations and abilities also gets limited. Therefore, top management in the 
business unit headquarters is not in a position to know when good judgments have been 
exercised. It limits the effectiveness of behavioral controls (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). 
In conclusion, in MNCs the emphasis placed on financial controls is expected to remain very 
high with decentralization. However, decentralization of decisions is likely to decrease the 
emphasis on nonfinancial and behavioral controls, and consequently, to lead to a higher relative 
emphasis on financial controls. A positive association between the level of decision-making 
decentralization and relative emphasis on financial controls has been found by Kihn (1997, 
2001). 
 
Perceived environmental changes comprise the third situational factor of this study. 
Environmental changes may occur in external aspects of foreign subsidiaries related to 
customers, distributors, governments, technical developments, supply sources, and 
competitors, as well as in internal environments. The effects of these specific environmental 
factors are still largely unknown, but as studies by Khandwalla (1972) and Ittner and Larcker 
(1998) have indicated many of these, such as competitors and customers, are highly 
important external factors. Whilst some aspects of PECs can become highly predictable over 
time, PECs are typically assumed to be associated with high levels of uncertainty, which in 
turn can impact managerial performance evaluations.  
 
Galbraith’s (1973) theory, discussed in detail in Chapman (1997) suggests that uncertainty 
reflects an information deficit, and hence increases the need for information. The strategies 
for resolving this problem should revolve around giving attention to the way in which 
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organizations process information. In addition to increasing the amount of interaction 
between managers, this could include the use of several sources of (less than perfect) control 
information. Therefore, HQs’ emphasis on output and behavioral controls should increase, or 
at least remain high in the case of MNCs, with increasing uncertainty.  
   
Hassel’s (1991) survey of a Finnish MNC reported a high reliance on accounting 
performance measures (APMs) regardless of what was called “environmental dynamism”. 
HQs were reported not to have other alternatives than to place a high emphasis on APMs 
when they needed tight monitoring, because such controls are most cost-effective for MNCs 
faced with great geographical and cultural distances. To a certain extent, this might also be 
the case with other forms of controls. While prior studies have not typically empirically 
explored the extent of emphasis on behavioral controls under conditions of increasing 
uncertainty, there is evidence to suggest that managers generally increase the emphasis on 
nonfinancial controls in such circumstances (Govindarjan, 1984). Gordon and Narayan 
(1984) have reported the importance of future- oriented information to managers in uncertain 
conditions. Chenhall and Morris (1986) found that perceived environmental uncertainty was 
associated with timely information of broad scope, including nonfinancial information.  The 
results reported in Kihn’s (2007, 543) correlation table suggest positive associations between 
PECs and nonfinancial and behavioral controls in a sample of 36 business units of Finnish 
based MNCs. The current study further explores whether top management’s emphasis on 
nonfinancial and behavioral controls increases with increasing PECs in a large sample of 
Finnish based MNCs. Such increases would, in turn, lead to a lower relative emphasis on 
financial controls.  
 
In summary, it is expected that in MNCs, top management’s absolute emphasis on financial 
controls tends to remain high towards the contingencies examined, but that their relative 
emphasis on such controls can be adjusted owing to situational variations in the emphasis placed 
on nonfinancial and behavioral controls. The following hypotheses summarize the possible 
simultaneous effects of the various situational variables on foreign subsidiary manager 
evaluations in MNCs that will be empirically explored in this study (see Table 1): 
 
H1: The emphasis placed by HQs on nonfinancial controls in evaluating foreign 
subsidiary managers is positively related to geographical dispersion and PECs, and 
negatively related to decentralization. 
H2: The emphasis placed by HQs on behavioral controls in evaluating foreign subsidiary 
managers is positively related to PECs, and negatively related to geographical 
dispersion and decentralization.  
H3: The relative emphasis placed by HQs on financial controls in evaluating foreign 
subsidiary managers is negatively related to geographical dispersion and PECs, and 
positively related to decentralization.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3  Method  
 
3.1 Sample 
 
The data of this study was collected from the headquarters of Finnish based MNCs. This 
approach was feasible and appropriate given that the study is interested in the viewpoints of top 
managers at the business unit headquarters. Scores collected from top management (i.e., not 
from  foreign subsidiary management) allowed direct measurement of top management’s 
evaluations. 
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The target sample of the study comprised the entire population of 102 industrial, banking, and 
consulting MNCs in Finland. In all of these companies, the Finnish parent company held at least 
one foreign manufacturing, banking, or consulting subsidiary with a more than a 50% interest. 
Data were collected from annual reports, and by administering a cross-sectional mail survey.
4
 
The survey respondents were fixed by design, selecting for those in key positions to conduct 
performance evaluations of foreign subsidiary managers. These were typically business unit (or 
divisional) managers in larger diversified firms, and corporate directors such as financial 
directors, vice presidents, or presidents in smaller, single-business firms. One respondent was 
selected from each business group (or division). The respondents were identified based on 
telephone calls, and information derived from annual reports. 
 
The questionnaire was pre-tested three times in a sample of thirteen academic experts and 
practitioners in order to improve content and construct validity, reliability and objectivity of 
the data. Afterwards, a total of 176 questionnaires were distributed by air mail to the 102 
companies.  Dillman’s (1978) total design method was used to boost the response rate. The 
initial request and three follow-ups yielded 103 usable responses, representing approximately 
59% of all mailed surveys. The number of usable responses per qualifying target population 
was even higher (about 68%), since some of the targeted respondents no longer met the 
criteria of the survey for the following reasons: mergers, lack of active operations, lack of 
active foreign operations, extensive restructuring, the appropriate contact persons were not 
Finnish speaking, or the questionnaire did not reach the qualifying contact person due to 
layoffs, long-term illnesses or organizational restructuring. The sample reduction process is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
73 respondents, representing 41% of the original 176 questionnaires (and about 32% of the 
qualifying target population) did not respond. Note that the reasons for not responding were 
also investigated. The identified reasons, such as being too busy and the size of overseas 
operations being too small, although not necessarily comprehensive, did not indicate a 
systematic bias in the actual sample.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
  
How representative the actual sample is, was analyzed with regard to selected key variables 
(such as proxies of the extent of the firm’s international business, broad industry sectors, and 
gender of respondents) using 2-sample t-tests and the chi-square goodness-of-fit-test. The actual 
and target sample did not differ significantly in regard to those variables at 0.05 significance 
level suggesting an absence of response bias. 
 
On average, the participants were around 49 years old. They had worked for their current 
company for an average of fifteen years. Table 3 summarizes the industrial sectors and 
industries that the respondents represented. Given the diversity of industries, there is no 
expectation of any systematic bias stemming from a particular industry in the findings. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here]  
3.2  Measures 
 
Appendix 1 detailes the English version of the survey questions.  The first set of questions 
(items 1a-1e) are related to controls, the second  set of questions to the extent of decentralization, 
and the third and final set of questions to PECs. Data of the frequency and geographical 
dispersion of foreign subsidiaries were collected from annual reports. 
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Controls The dependent variable assesses the extent to which senior managers at headquarters 
emphasize financial, nonfinancial, and behavioral controls in the performance evaluation of 
foreign subsidiary managers. Senior managers’ perceptions were assessed with five-item five-
point Likert scales. Specific examples of the controls were provided. Financial controls were 
defined to include, e.g., profit, return-on-investment, and residual income. The examples of 
controls for nonfinancial outcomes were market share, quality, and production volume. The 
following examples of behavioral (action accountability) controls were provided: achieve cost 
budgets & production standards, follow rules & procedures, and propose expenditure programs.   
 
Applying Keating’s (1997) questions on managerial performance evaluation, the respondents 
were asked to indicate: 1) the importance of controls in the evaluation of foreign subsidiary 
manager performance; 2) the frequency with which meetings are arranged with foreign 
subsidiary managers to discuss their performance on the controls; 3) the extent to which controls 
are considered to reflect the successful efforts of the subsidiary managers; 4) the attention paid 
by senior management to the periodic results of controls, and 5) the impact of good or poor 
results measured on the controls on managers’ rated performance.5 Each item was rated on a 
scale ranging from (1) not at all (not at all important) to (5) very much (very important). The 
values obtained for the five questions above were averaged for each measure. Low average 
values on the 1-5 scale indicate a low emphasis on controls, and high average values indicate a 
high emphasis. The Cronbach (1951) alpha statistic of internal reliability was 0.84 for the 
emphasis of financial controls, 0.79 for the emphasis of nonfinancial controls, and 0.83 for the 
emphasis of behavioral controls. These values are acceptable (Nunnally 1978).  
 
The descriptive statistics in Tables 4 and 5 show that while few responses scored around 2.5. 
(i.e., well below the mean), all the controls investigated were generally perceived to be 
emphasized to a very high extent. All the mean scores for financial controls (4.48) were higher 
than those of either the nonfinancial controls (4.23) or behavioral controls (3.89), and the mean 
scores of nonfinancial controls were higher than those of behavioral controls. All of these 
differences in means were statistically significant at the 0.000 level suggesting systematic 
differences in managers’ responses to questions. 
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 
The geographical dispersion of overseas operations was assessed in terms of whether the 
business unit has overseas subsidiaries in Europe (coded as 0) and/or outside Europe (coded as 
1). Objective archival data collected from annual reports allowed this kind of analysis. 48.4% of 
the business units (or single business companies) have foreign subsidiaries only within Europe. 
However, most of them (51.6%) have foreign subsidiaries also outside Europe, i.e. world scale 
operations.  
 
As Table 6 shows, the degree of decentralization was measured by applying a slightly 
modified version of Vancil’s (1979) well-tested instrument, which is rooted in the Aston 
Group approach (see Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, and Turner, 1968; Merchant, 1981; Chenhall 
and Morris 1986). The executives were asked to indicate “to what extent decisions are 
delegated to foreign subsidiary managers” on a five-point ordinal scale ranging from (1) “not 
at all” to (5) “totally” (see question no. 2 in the attached survey). Principal component 
analysis suggested five factors with Eigenvalues over one.  
 
The first component includes five items, which can be interpreted as decisions about prices 
and expenditures. It has an Eigenvalue of 3.126, and explains 18.4% of the variance. The 
second factor comprises four items, can be called as decisions about personnel, and it 
explains 17.5% of the variance. The third factor includes four items, and it can be interpreted 
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as product decisions. It has an Eigenvalue of 2.2, and explains 13.0% of the variance. The 
fourth factor includes two decisions about consultants. It has an Eigenvalue of 1.97, and 
explains 11.6% of the variance. The fifth factor is interpreted as decisions about vendors. It 
includes two items, and explains 11.3% of the variance. Cronbach alphas are acceptable: 
0.86, 0.85, 0.71, 0.87, and 0.81, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The rate of perceived environmental changes was measured with a 14-item five-point 
measurement instrument (see question no. 3 in the attached questionnaire). This instrument 
asks the respondents to rate the experienced rate of change regarding customers, distributors, 
government relations, technical developments, supplies from capital, raw material and labor 
markets, competitors’ actions, impacts of interdependency and company policies, and overall 
environmental changes. The five-point scale ranges from (1) “never” to (5) “very often”. The 
lower the score, the lower the perceived degree of environmental changes in overseas 
subsidiaries, and vice versa. The selected instrument is similar to the one used by Hassel 
(1991), except that to simplify measurement the respondents were not requested to rate the 
items as either critical or non-critical to their decision making. Instead, a principal component 
analysis was conducted to analyze the structure of the first 13 variables. 
    
As Table 7 shows, the principal components analysis with a varimax rotation suggested four 
components with statistically significant loadings of 0.55 and above. The first component 
includes five items and is interpreted as perceived changes in competitors’ actions.  It has an 
Eigenvalue of 3.52, and explains 29.35% of the variance. Three items load to the second 
component. It is called changes in customers, distributors, and governments. The component 
has an Eigenvalue of 1.58, and explains 13.2% of the variance. The third component includes 
two items explaining changes in supply sources. The Eigenvalue of this component is 1.32 
and it explains 10.96% of the total variance. The fourth and final factor has two items. They 
are related to changes in internal environments. The component has an Eigenvalue of 1.07, 
and it explains 8.95% of the variance. The Cronbach reliability alphas for summative scales 
were mostly acceptable (i.e., 0.78, 0.64, 0.60, and 0.40, respectively).  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Control variable.  
The size of corporation was approximated with the volume of sales. The most recent public 
domain sales figures available from the whole corporation were adopted. On average the sales of 
the investigated companies amounted to 437.3 million euros, ranging from 2.5 million euros to 
7,551 million euros at the time of the research. 
 
Table 8 shows Pearson correlations for the investigated variables. The main results from Table 8 
were that positive and relatively high and statistically significant associations were found 
between the controls, and positive and statistically significant associations were found between 
nonfinancial controls and geographical dispersion (0.209, p<0.05), and between nonfinancial 
controls and changes in competitors and technical developments (0.267, p<0.01). All the other 
associations between the controls and the contingency variables were not statistically significant. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4  Results and analysis 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the three hypotheses, which expect that HQs’ 
emphasis on various forms of controls may vary with the contingencies selected. Multiple 
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regression analysis was selected, since it is a powerful and robust tool to analyze the relationship 
between a single dependent variable and several independent variables, including principal 
components (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham, 2006, p. 176).
6
 Note that each of the 
three hypotheses of this study had a single dependent variable and multiple independent 
variables. The following linear regression model was used: 
 
Y= b0 + b1 GEO + b2DEC1  + b3DEC 2  + b4DEC 3  + b5DEC 4  + b6DEC 5  + b7PEC1  + 
b8PEC 2  + b9PEC 3  + b10PEC 4  + b11 SIZ + e 
 
  where Y1-4 = Emphasis on financial (/nonfinancial/behavioral/relative 
   financial) controls to evaluate foreign subsidiary managers 
 b0-11 =   Estimated parameters 
 GEO =  Geographical dispersion of overseas subsidiaries 
 DEC1-5 =  Decentralization of decision rights (principal components) 
 PEC1-4  =  Perceived environmental change (principal components)  
 SIZ =   Size  
 e =   Error term 
 
A key expectation of this study was that emphasis placed by HQs on financial controls in 
evaluating foreign subsidiary managers is not significantly related to geographical dispersion, 
decision making decentralization, or PECs. As the multiple regression analysis results in the first 
column of Table 9 show, the data of this study do not suggest statistically significant effects. All 
the observed coefficients between financial controls and the examined contingencies were close, 
or fairly close, to zero and statistically insignificant.
7
 Hence, as expected, the data suggest that 
top management in business units emphasizes financial controls, regardless of variations in the 
contingencies examined. 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
4.1   Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 tests whether HQs’ emphasis on nonfinancial controls in evaluating foreign 
subsidiary managers is positively related to geographical dispersion and PECs, and negatively 
related to decentralization. As the second column in Table 9 shows, the emphasis placed by 
HQs on nonfinancial controls is positively associated with geographical dispersion (t=1.79, 
p=0.077). The results further suggest that one of the analyzed decision-making factors, 
product decisions, produced a negative and statistically significant effect regarding HQs’ 
emphasis on nonfinancial controls (t= -2.17, p=0.033). Perceived changes in competitors’ 
actions and in customers, distributors, and governments is reflected by a statistically 
significant increase in the emphasis placed on nonfinancial results controls (i.e., t=2.34, 
p=0.021; and t=2.16, p=0.034). The other environmental factors do not show statistically 
significant effects. Finally, the emphasis on nonfinancial controls was negatively associated 
with organizational size (t= -1.90, p=0.061). These results provide partial support for the first 
hypothesis.
8
 
 
4.1   Hypothesis 2  
 
Hypothesis 2 explores whether HQs’ emphasis on behavioral controls in evaluating foreign 
subsidiary managers is positively related to PECs, and negatively related to geographical 
dispersion and decentralization. As shown in the third column of Table 8, geographical 
dispersion does not appear to be related to the emphasis on behavioral control. However, the 
decentralization of decision-making with respect to prices and expenditures is negatively 
related to the emphasis on behavioral controls (t= -2.14, p=0.036). PECs in customers, 
distributors, and governments also seem to be negatively related to the emphasis placed on 
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behavioral controls (t= -2.13, p=0.036). These results provide partial support for the second 
hypothesis.
9
 
 
4.3   Hypothesis 3 
 
The third hypothesis predicts that the relative emphasis placed by top management on 
financial controls in evaluating foreign subsidiary managers is negatively related to 
geographical dispersion and PECs, and positively related to decentralization. The results in 
the fourth and final column of Table 9 suggest that the hypothesized effect of geographical 
dispersion is not supported. A positive and statistically significant association between the 
relative emphasis on financial controls and decentralization of decision rights with regard to 
prices and expenditures is found (t=2.39, p=0.006). This strong effect appears to be due to a 
decreasing emphasis on behavioral controls for such decision rights (as the second column of 
Table 9 shows). The effects of the other decision rights are not supported. All the effects of 
PECs are negative, as expected. Two of the effects are also statistically significant, notably 
PECs in competitors and PECs in supply sources. The first effect appears to be due to 
increasing emphasis on nonfinancial controls with increasing PECs in competitors. The 
relative emphasis on financial controls is positively related to corporate size (t=2.36, 
p=0.021). This appears to be due to variation in the emphasis on nonfinancial controls with 
increasing corporate size.  In conclusion, all three hypotheses are partially supported to 
various degrees by the study results.  
 
5  Discussion and conclusions  
 
This study reports the findings of a detailed empirical analysis designed to further our 
understanding of how the determinants of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls vary in 
foreign subsidiary manager performance evaluations. In particular, the study contributed to the 
simultaneous analysis of the impacts of geographical dispersion of foreign subsidiaries, 
decision-making decentralization to foreign subsidiary managers, and perceived environmental 
changes (PEC) in foreign subsidiaries. The following main results have several implications for 
the researchers, designers and users of managerial performance evaluation systems in the 
context of MNCs.  
 
First, the results clearly show variation in the determinants of the controls examined, and hence 
further understanding of the contingent nature of managerial performance evaluations. Contrary 
to prior results from domestic and single-country settings (e.g. Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; 
Brownell, 1987), and as expected, survey data and additional documentary data from 90 
participants suggested that financial controls are not adjusted towards the contingencies 
analyzed, rather, that they remain strongly emphasized in the MNCs investigated. This result, 
obtained from top managers of a wide range of Finnish MNCs, is in line with and extends 
Hassel’s (1991) results on the effects of environmental contingencies on the RAPM. Hence, the 
results further support the theory that in MNCs, HQ do not have other alternatives than to place 
a high emphasis on financial controls, because such controls are most cost effective for MNCs 
faced with great geographical and cultural distances. 
 
Second, several regularities were found between the factors examined and nonfinancial 
controls in particular, and between behavioral controls to a smaller extent. Top management’s 
emphasis on nonfinancial controls was positively associated with the extent of geographical 
dispersion, PEC in competitors’ actions, and PEC in customers, distributors and 
governments. The emphasis on nonfinancial controls was negatively associated with 
decentralization of product decisions. The emphasis on behavioral controls was also 
positively related to PEC in customers, distributors and governments, and negatively related 
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to price and expenditure decisions. These results are in line with Kihn (2007), which, among 
other things, documented positive associations between PECs and nonfinancial and 
behavioral controls in a smaller sample of 36 business units of Finnish based MNCs. 
 
In the current study, detailed analysis of the various factors of PEC and decentralization 
helped in identifying what types of factors are the most important ones. The most important 
organizational factors in this study were decentralization of decision rights for products, which 
had a strong negative effect on the emphasis on nonfinancial controls; and decentralization of 
decision rights on prices and expenditures, which had a negative effect on the emphasis of 
behavioral controls. The most important environmental factors were PEC in competitors, and 
PEC in customers, distributors and governments, which were positively associated with the 
emphasis on nonfinancial and/or behavioral controls.  The effects of geographical dispersion and 
corporate size on nonfinancial controls were marginally supported by the study. These results 
suggest that factor analysis could also be pursued in future research (i.e., whenever the sample 
size is large enough to allow such an analysis). 
 
Third, the new evidence of this study also indicates variation in top management’s relative 
emphasis on financial controls due to situational variations in the emphasis placed on 
nonfinancial and behavioral controls. The relative emphasis on financial controls is positively 
associated with decentralization of decision rights on prices and expenditures, and negatively 
associated with PEC in competitors’ actions, corporate size, and PEC in supply sources (in that 
order of significance). To a large extent, the relative emphasis on financial controls appears to be 
a derivative of the emphasis on nonfinancial controls. These results extend the literature on the 
relative use of performance measures (Ittner and Larcker, 1997; Keating, 1997; Kihn, 1997, 
2001). While the effects of company goals, transfer pricing, decentralization, and degree of 
multidomestic (/global) strategy have been empirically supported in previous studies (Kihn, 
1997, 2001), these results increase the number of empirically supported contingency factors that 
seem to impact top management’s relative emphasis on financial controls in the performance 
evaluations of foreign subsidiary managers.  
 
The other factors tested as possible determinants were not empirically supported by the data of 
this study. The reasons for this may be theoretical, methodological, or empirical. First, the study 
was explorative in nature, since there was no well-developed theory in the topic area. Second, 
the exact consequences of multiple predictors are difficult to estimate in cross-sectional research. 
This is, because in combination multiple contingencies may have synergistic effects on each 
other that intensify the effects, or they may have opposite effects on each other that even-out 
certain performance outcomes (Chenhall, 2006). In the results, we may have seen a little bit of 
both. As an example of the former, nonfinancial controls had few statistically significant 
correlations with the contingencies examined, but multiple regression analysis suggested many 
more significant associations. As an example of the latter, the relative emphasis on financial 
controls was not significantly related to the extent of geographical dispersion, even if it was 
significantly related to the emphasis placed on nonfinancial controls. Third, culture may have 
played a role in the results given that the results of both Hassel’s (1991) survey and this study 
are based on MNCs headquartered in Finland. Finally, some previous studies have also 
documented that the effects of contingency variables on questions examined were limited 
(Anthony et al., 1992). In short, human behavior is complex and can be influenced by many 
factors.  
 
This study has certain limitations that should be mentioned. First, the study by no means 
represents an exhaustive identification of the determinants of control emphases for the 
evaluation of foreign subsidiary managers. It has merely identified some of the many 
situational factors that can affect top management’s control choices. Further research could 
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be directed at identifying additional determinants; for example, compensation systems, 
various psychological, social and economic variables affecting the perceived choice and 
emphasis of controls. This would further our understanding of the individual and social 
differences and various evaluation styles that are present under similar circumstances, thus 
ideally leading to more effective design and use of managerial performance evaluation 
systems. Second, a number of organizational and environmental factors have been assumed 
as being exogenous to control emphasis. It is possible, however, that the extent of 
organizational factors and the emphasis on controls are determined simultaneously (cf. 
Keating, 1997, p. 267). Third, the survey instrument was designed to collect data of the 
simultaneous emphasis placed on financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls. The 
respondents were not expected to rank the use of these types of controls in this study. Further 
surveys could ask managers to rank the competing ways to evaluate performance to see 
which one dominates. Fourth, these results may describe the situations of some, in particular 
Finnish, MNCs better than others. The results are nevertheless based on mean as opposed to 
any other type of value to create, on average, the least possible error. Fifth, response bias is 
possible, although attempts were made to control for it, and statistical results (on p. 9) did not 
reveal any. The limitations notwithstanding, the results have important implications for 
managerial performance evaluation systems and they suggest that much can be learned about 
the contingent use of multiple forms of controls. 
 
Future research could be directed at analyzing the perceptions of foreign subsidiary 
managers. In addition, the study could be replicated in other countries. Finally, whether the 
results predict future could also be examined. 
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Table 1  Summary of hypotheses 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Hypothesized relationships between HQs’ emphasis of  nonfinancial controls, behavioral controls, and 
the relative emphasis on financial controls in the evaluation of foreign subsidiary managers and the extent 
of (i) geographical dispersion (i.e., whether the business unit has foreign subsidiaries outside Europe), (ii) 
perceived environmental changes, and (iii) decentralization of decision making rights. 
 
     Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3  
     Effect on Effect on Relative effect  
Factor affecting    nonfinancial behavioral  on financial 
control emphasis   controls  controls  controls  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Geographical dispersion   +  -  - 
 
Perceived environmental changes +  +  - 
 
Decentralization of decision-  -  -  + 
making rights 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  Sample reduction process 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
        Frequency of Frequency of 
        firms  participants 
Finnish corporations with at least one overseas subsidiary with 
an over 50% interest held by the Finnish parent: 
 Manufacturing companies     83  154 
 Consulting companies      16   16 
 Banks          3     6 
 Total:       102  176 
 
Less: Nonrespondents, because of 
 Merged firms        8     0 
Firms/divisions without active operations     1     2 
 Firms/divisions without active foreign operations    6     6 
 Firms with extensive restructuring     1     1 
 Firms/divisions without Finnish speaking key person   1     9 
 Contact person not reached      2      6 
 Total:        19   24 
 
= Actually qualifying target sample     83  152 
Less: Other nonrespondents      23    48 
= Respondents        60  104 
Less: An outlier             1 
          103 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 Respondents by industrial sectors and industries 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Industrial sectors 
 Manufacturing    85% 
 Consulting     7 % 
 Banking      4 % 
 
Panel B: Industries 
 Metals     27.2% 
 Wood, paper or board    15.5% 
 Glass and steel     8.7% 
Consulting      6.8% 
Chemical      5.8% 
Oil, coal or nuclear     5.8% 
Plastic       5.8% 
Food, drink, or tobacco    4.9% 
Banking      3.9% 
Textile, clothing, leather, or shoes  2.9% 
Furniture      2.9% 
Electronics, computer, etc.    2.9% 
Printing      1.0% 
Mining       1.0% 
Energy and water     1.0% 
Not available
1
      3.9% 
__________________________________________________________ 
1 
Four respondents did not use pre-coded return envelopes. 
 
 
 
Table 4  Descriptive statistics 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                              Mean  StDev   Theoretical   Actual             Cronbach   N   
                                                                                          range          range                alpha 
Superiors’ emphasis of:
1
 
-      Financial controls   4.48
 a, b
  0.55  1.00-5.00 2.40-5.00 0.84 103 
-      Nonfinancial controls  4.23
 b, c
   0.55    1.00-5.00    2.80-5.00   0.79   103   
-       Behavioral controls   3.89
 c, a  
0.69   1.00-5.00    2.20-5.00    0.83 103     
-      Relative financial controls  0.56  0.09 0.10-2.50 0.32-0.96                    103 
Number of foreign subsidiaries:  
- in North America         1.46       3.71  0-                 0-32                      92 
- Europe                                        7.20   7.65  0-                 0-36                 92 
- Asia                                            0.70      1.55   0-                 0-8                          92  
- Australia                                    0.30      1.07   0-                 0-9                          92 
- South America                    0.12      0.57   0-                 0-4                          92 
- Africa                                         0.03      0.18   0-                 0-1                          92 
- In total                                         9.73    11.03   0-                  1-58                        93 
- Outside Europe   0.52  0.50 0-1          0-1     93 
- Size of sales (mEUR)               437.29   879.10 0-                 2.50-7551                   91 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1
 Measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all/not at all important) to 5 (very much/very important). 
a
 Significantly different from nonfinancial controls mean at 0.000 level. 
b
 Sinificantly different from behavioral controls mean at 0.000 level. 
c
 Significantly different from financial controls mean at 0.000 level. 
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Table 5  Emphasis on controls in the evaluation of foreign subsidiary managers 1  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                     Financial          Nonfinancial Behavioral  
                     controls            controls  controls  
                 Mean
a,b 
StDev Mean
b,c
 StDev Mean
a, c
 StDev  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Importance in the evaluation of foreign 4.75 0.50 4.35 0.65 4.16 0.75  
    subsidiary manager performance 
2. Frequency with which meetings are   4.34 0.82 4.24 0.86 3.91 1.03 
    arranged with foreign subsidiary  
    managers to discuss their performance  
    on the controls 
3. Extent to which controls reflect  4.38 0.78 4.24 0.69 3.93 0.87 
    successful effort by the foreign  
    subsidiary managers 
4. Attention paid by senior management  4.52 0.62 4.19 0.78 3.63 0.94 
    to periodic results of controls 
5. Impact of good or bad results regarding  4.38 0.76 4.12 0.75 3.82 0.89 
    the controls on foreign subsidiary 
    manager’s rated performance 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1
 Measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all/not at all important) to 5 (very important/very much). 
a
 The means in this column are significantly different from nonfinancial controls means at 0.000 level. 
b
 The means in this column are sinificantly different from behavioral controls means at 0.000 level. 
C
 The means in this column are significantly different from financial controls means at 0.000 level. 
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Table 6  Results of principal component analysis (loadings) of survey questions on 
decision-making decentralization. a   
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
         Components: 
      _________________________________________________ 
Decentralization of decisions about:               Prices and  Personnel Products Consultants Vendors
            expenditures 
1.  Discontinuing a major product or product line    0.269  0.123  0.688 -0.026 -0.136  
3.  Expanding into new marketing territories   0.212 -0.086  0.567  0.399  0.041 
4.  Increasing capacity with a new investment              -0.074  0.101  0.807 -0.028  0.142 
5.  Developing a new product line      0.112  0.123  0.723  0.217  0.188 
7.  Selecting an outside vendor to supply raw material  0.386  0.110  0.211  0.107  0.748 
8.  Selecting the vendor to supply major components  0.199  0.175  0.031  0.174  0.844 
9.  Hiring a consultant in developing operating systems   0.265  0.114  0.131  0.836  0.252 
10. Hiring a consultant for special studies   0.183  0.275  0.105  0.849  0.058 
11. Increasing the planned level of advertising  
      expenditures         0.704  0.201  0.211  0.315 -0.056 
12. Changing the sales price of a major product    0.768  0.048  0.165  0.002  0.307 
13. Changing the policy governing the level  
     of inventories       0.691  0.109  0.021  0.094  0.422 
14. Increasing the number of personnel employed in  
     their units       0.707  0.262 -0.006  0.316  0.248 
15. Increasing the number of non-exempt personnel  0.706  0.367  0.192  0.216  0.070 
16. Promoting on of their lower-level managers     0.176  0.900 -0.013  0.145  0.071 
17. Firing one of their direct subordinates  0.108  0.822  0.042  0.062  0.269 
18. Hiring a new person from outside      0.294  0.768  0.094  0.085  0.253 
19. Determining the size of a bonus to a direct     0.095  0.678  0.223  0.132 -0.155 
      subordinate   
Eigenvalues      3.126   2.971   2.211   1.972   1.922 
% of variance                18.39% 17.48% 13.01% 11.60% 11.31% 
Cumulative %              18.39% 35.86% 48.87% 60.47% 71.78% 
n=103 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
a 
Varimax Rotated Component Matrix with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
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Table 7 Results of principal component analysis (loadings) of survey questions on the 
extent of perceived environmental changes.a 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
               Components: 
  _________________________________________________ 
             Competitors’    Customers,  Supply               Internal 
Perceived environmental changes in: actions          distributors, etc. sources         environments 
 
1.  Customer   0.415  0.723   0.224  -0.052 
2.  Distributor   0.141  0.753  -0.149   0.288 
3.  Government   0.023  0.699   0.214   0.047 
4.  Technical developments   0.569  0.016   0.374   0.024 
5.  Supply Sources: Capital markets       -0.092  0.164   0.828   0.086 
6.  Supply Sources: Raw material  0.217  0.049   0.779   0.044 
     markets 
8.  Competitors actions: Product   0.759  0.181   0.026  -0.212 
      innovation 
9.  Competitors actions: Advertising  0.803  0.072   0.023   0.279 
10. Competitors actions: Distribution  0.678  0.186   0.046   0.373 
11. Competitors actions: Pricing   0.740  0.113  -0.024  -0.141 
12. Goals & strategies   0.014  0.141  -0.005   0.668 
13. Interdependency      0.001  0.023    0.128   0.762 
Eigenvalues:   3.522   1.584    1.315   1.074 
% of variance:  29.35%             13.20%              10.96%   8.95% 
Cumulative %  29.35%            42.55%  53.50%              62.45% 
n=103 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  
Varimax Rotated Component Matrix with Kaiser Normalization.  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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Table 8 Correlations between variables.  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.  Financial    1 
     controls 
2.  Nonfinancial   0.388** 1 
     controls 
3.  Behavioral    0.336** 0.511**  1    
     controls 
4.  Geographical   0.097   0.209* -.013   1 
     dispersion 
Changes in: 
5.  Competitors &          -0.029   .267** 0.156   0.161 1 
     technical  
     developments  
6.  Customers,   0.062   0.107   0.093  -.206*   0.000   1 
     distributors & 
     government 
7.  Supply sources   0.022   0.133   0.011   0.114   0.000   0.000   1 
8. Internal   -0.111  -0.035   0.010   0.112   0.000   0.000   0.000 1 
     environments 
Decisions about: 
 9. Prices &   0.150   0.032  -0.148   0.058 -0.110   0.006   0.140 -0.015 1 
      Expenditures 
10. Personnel  -0.043  -0.026  -0.053 -0.075 -0.028 -0.035   0.074  0.054     0.000   1 
11. Products  -0.043  -0.101   0.192 -0.098   0.105   0.051  -0.118  0.294**  0.000    0.000   1 
12. Consultants    0.032   0.051 -0.025   0.158 -0.044 -0.326** 0.170  0.027     0.000   0.000    0.000    1 
13. Vendors    0.182  -0.012   0.008 -0.095 -0.009 -0.138    0.070 -0.259**  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   1 
14. Size    0.146  -0.003   -0.038   0.228*  0.247*  0.025    0.084   0.070    -0.015 -0.085   -0.198    0.172    0.032   1   
  
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 9 Statistics from regressions of emphasis of controls on geographical dispersion, decentralization of decision-making rights, size, and PEC.    
 
Y= b0 + b1 GEO + b2DEC1  + b3DEC 2  + b4DEC 3  + b5DEC 4  + b6DEC 5  + b7PEC1  + b8PEC 2  + b9PEC 3  + b10PEC 4  + b11 SIZ + e 
Dependent variable:              
   Emphasis of    Emphasis of   Emphasis of                  Relative Emphasis of 
    Financial Control      Nonfinancial Controls         Behavioral Controls                 FinancialControls  
 Independent variables: B t p            B t p               B t p                             B t p         .                                 
Intercept    4.38 47.15 0.000   4.14     48.13 0.000   3.87 34.31 0.000   0.55 42.75  0.000  
Geographical dispersion  0.12  0.94 n.s.   0.22  1.79 0.077   0.06   0.38 n.s.  -0.01 -0.33 n.s. 
Decision-making 
decentralization of: 
  Prices & expenditures  0.08  1.30 n.s   0.01  0.26 n.s.  -0.16 -2.14 0.036    0.02   2.30 0.006 
  Personnel  -0.00       -0.07 n.s.   0.00  0.06 n.s.   0.01  0.12 n.s.  -0.00 -0.29 n.s. 
  Products   -0.01 -0.14 n.s.  -0.13 -2.17 0.033                  0.11  1.31 n.s.  -0.00 -0.11 n.s. 
  Consultants   0.03  0.49 n.s.   0.07  1.20 n.s.   0.02  0.20 n.s.  -0.00 -0.37 n.s. 
  Vendors   0.10  1.48 n.s.   0.02  0.39 n.s.   0.05  0.63 n.s.    0.01  0.98 n.s. 
PEC in:  
  Competitors  -0.04 -0.57 n.s.  0.15  2.36 0.021   0.11  1.29 n.s.  -0.03 -2.62 0.011 
  Customers etc.   0.06  0.85 n.s.  0.13  2.16 0.034   0.14  1.75 0.083  -0.02 -1.6 n.s. 
  Supply sources  -0.03 -0.53 n.s.  0.06  0.97 n.s.   0.07  0.90 n.s.  -0.02 -1.72 0.09 
  Internal environment -0.05 -0.69 n.s  0.07  1.05 n.s.  -0.00 -0.04 n.s.  -0.01 -1.34 n.s. 
Size   -0.00  1.05 n.s.              -0.00 -1.90 0.061  -0.00 -0.67 n.s.    0.00  2.36 0.021 
R Square   0.10     0.21     0.14      0.28 
Adj R
2 
   -0.03
     
0.10     0.02      0.17 
F     0.8     1.87     1.17      2.70 
Sig.     n.s.     0.056     n.s.      0.005 
n     90     90  _   90      90 
 
Appendix 1:  The English version of the survey questions 
 
 
1a.  How important do you perceive each of the following types of measures to be in the evaluation of foreign 
 subsidiary managers? (Please circle the appropriate number on the 5-point scale below). 
 
                 Not at all   Of little   Some     Quite      Very 
                                 important    importance   what   important   important 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS (e.g., profit,  
 return-on-investment, and residual income)............………… 1 2 3 4 5 
  
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS (market share, quality,  
 production volume, etc.).………………..............………..... 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS (e.g.,  follow rules  & procedures 
 achieve cost budgets & production standards, and propose 
 expenditure programs)……………..………………………..… 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1b. How often do you arrange meetings with foreign subsidiary managers to discuss their performance on the 
 following types of measures? (1=never, 2=seldom, 3=only if the performance is significantly below 
 expectations, 4=quite often, and 5=regularly). 
 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS .......................................................  1 2 3 4 5 
              NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS ……….......................................  1  2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS……………………….…………  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1c. To what extent do the following types of measures 
 reflect whether foreign subsidiary managers are   Not at all   A little    Some     Quite      Very 
 succeeding or failing with the business?                                          what      a lot       much 
 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS ….……….................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS …………………….………….. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1d. How much attention do you pay to periodic (i.e., 
 weekly or monthly) reports of results based on 
 the following types of measures, when you evaluate 
 the performance of foreign subsidiary managers? 
 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS ……........................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS ….…………………………….. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1e. How much impact do good or bad results measured in 
 the following types of measures have on the rated  
 performance of foreign subsidiary managers? 
 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS ….……….............................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS ……………………………..…. 1 2 3 4 5 
  
2 
2 
2.      To what extent are the following decisions made 
         by foreign subsidiary managers?                  Not at all     A Little       Some       Very       Totally 
                         what        much       
Discontinuing a major existing product or product line   1 2 3 4 5 
Redesigning products for a major existing product line   1 2 3 4 5 
Expanding into new marketing territories for existing product(s)  1 2 3 4 5
  
Increasing Capacity with a new investment    1 2 3 4 5 
Developing a major new product line     1 2 3 4 5 
Buying from an outside vendor when the items required   
 could be supplied by another unit in your corporation   1 2 3 4 5 
Selecting an outside vendor to supply an important raw 
 material or component used in operations    1 2 3 4 5 
Selecting the vendor to supply major components for  
 an approved capital expenditure project    1 2 3 4 5 
Hiring a consultant for assistance in developing or   
 modifying operating systems      1 2 3 4 5 
Hiring a consultant for special studies     1 2 3 4 5 
Increasing the planned level of expenditures for an  
 advertising project       1 2 3 4 5 
Changing the sales price of a major product    1 2 3 4 5 
Changing the policy governing the level of  
 investment in inventories      1 2 3 4 5 
Increasing the number of personnel employed in their units   1 2 3 4 5 
Increasing the number of non-exempt personnel employed  
 in their units       1 2 3 4 5 
Promoting one of their lower-level managers to a higher  
 position        1 2 3 4 5 
Firing one of their direct subordinates     1 2 3 4 5 
Hiring a new person from outside     1 2 3 4 5 
Determining the size of a bonus to be paid to a direct subordinate  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
3. To what extent do the following aspects change in your foreign subsidiaries? 
 
                       Never       Very     Sometimes     Often       Very 
                       rarely                  often 
Customer buying patterns and requirements………………….…………. 1 2 3 4 5 
Distributor attitudes and requirements……………………….…..………. 1 2 3 4 5 
Government regulations and reporting regulations………….…………… 1 2 3 4 5 
Technical developments relevant to your business…………..…………… 1 2 3 4 5 
Supply sources: 
  Capital markets………………………………………………..…….. .   1 2 3 4 5 
  Raw material markets………………….………………………………  1 2 3 4 5 
  Labor markets…………………………….……………….………….…. 1 2 3 4 5 
Competitor actions: 
  Product innovation……………………….……………………………… 1 2 3 4 5 
  Advertising………………………………………………………….…  1 2 3 4 5 
  Distribution……………………………………………………………… 1 2 3 4 5 
  Pricing…………………………………………………………..…….   1 2 3 4 5 
Impact of goals and strategies of the corporation………………….……... 1 2 3 4 5 
Interdependence with other units within the corporation…………………. 1 2 3 4 5 
Overall change in business environment………………………………….. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Notes: 
1
 Some examples include Hawkins (1965), McInnes (1971), Robbins and Stobaugh (1973), 
Person and Lessig (1979), Choi and Czechowicz, and Appleyard, Strong and Walton (1990). 
2
 See Chenhall (2003) and Ittner and Larcker (1998) for detailed and extensive literature 
reviews. 
3
 See Hawkins (1965), Mauriel (1969), McInnes (1971), Robbins & Stobaugh (1973), Person 
and Lessig (1979), Morsicato and Diamond (1980), Abdallah and Keller (1985), Appleyard, 
Strong, & Walton (1990), and Duangployo and Gray (1991).  
4
 In addition, if not available from the other sources, some statistical data were collected by 
telephone calls, and e-mails. 
5
 Note that Keating also measured survey items on performance rewarding, but they were not 
included, since that was beyond the scope of this study.  
6
 Initially the use of both logistic and multiple regression analysis were considered, and the 
hypotheses were tested in both ways. Since the results did not differ significantly, multiple 
regression analysis was selected. Following a series of prior studies, the ordinal data was treated 
as interval. Studies show that this is an established method of analyzing data in social sciences, 
not very consequential, and widely agreed as good scaling by scientists, as many studies have 
shown (e.g. Labovitz 1967, 1970; Bohrnstedt & Carter, 1971; Asher, 1976; Nunnally, 1978). 
7
  When variance inflation factors (VIP) were examined for predictors, no concern was found 
for multicollinearity: the simple correlations were quite low and all VIPs were less than 1.263 
( i.e., substantially below 10, see Stevens, 2002). Existence of outliers and influential data 
points were checked with standard residuals and with Cook’s distance. However, all standard 
residuals were below 3.0, indicating lack of outliers on y. All Cook’s distances were below 
0.194 indicating lack of influential data points. 
8
  Multicollinearity was checked and no concern was found for it. In addition, all standardized 
residuals were below 2.685 (i.e., < 3.0), and all Cook’s Distances below 0.142 (i.e. <1), 
indicating acceptable results.  
9
  Multicollinearity was not found. Residual statistics indicated that all standardized residuals 
were below 2.122 (i.e., <3.0), and Cook’s Distances below 0.166 (i.e., <1.0), and hence 
acceptable. 
